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We provide a class of bound entangled states that have positive distillable secure key rate. The
smallest state of this kind is 4 ⊗ 4. Our class is a generalization of the class presented in [1]. It is
much wider, containing, in particular, states from the boundary of PPT entangled states (all of the
states in the class in [1] were of this kind) but also states inside the set of PPT entangled states,
even, approaching the separable states. This generalization comes with a price: for the wider class a
positive key rate requires, in general, apart from the one-way Devetak-Winter protocol (used in [1])
also the recurrence preprocessing and thus effectively is a two-way protocol. We also analyze the
amount of noise that can be admixtured to the states of our class without losing key distillability
property which may be crucial for experimental realization. The wider class contains key-distillable
states with higher entropy (up to 3.524, as opposed to 2.564 for the class in [1]).
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, pioneered by Wiesner [2], al-
lows to obtain cryptographic key based on physical im-
possibility of eavesdropping. Namely, if the transmitted
signal is encoded into quantum states, then by reading
it, eavesdropper always introduces noise into the signal.
Thus Alice and Bob – the parties who want to communi-
cate privately – can measure the level of noise and detect
whether their transmission is secure (even if the noise
was solely due to eavesdropping). There are two types of
quantum key distribution protocols: prepare and measure
(as the original BB84 protocol [3]) and protocols based
on a shared entangled state (originated from the Ekert’s
protocol [4]). For quite a time security proofs of pre-
pare and measure protocols had been based on showing
equivalence to the distillation (by local operations and
classical communication) of maximally entangled states
(the first such proof is due to Shor and Preskill [5]). It
have led to a belief that security of the quantum cryp-
tography is always connected to the distillation of the
maximally entangled states (this issue was perhaps first
touched by Gisin and Wolf [6]).
This belief suggested that one could not obtain secure
key from bound entangled states [7], i.e., states from
which maximally entangled states cannot be distilled. On
the contrary, the key-distillable bound entangled states
have been found [8] and examples of low dimensional
states have been provided [1]. The multipartite case was
also considered [9]. There are two approaches to obtain-
ing cryptographic key from bound entangled PPT states:
one is based on approximating private bit with a PPT
state [8, 10] and the other one – on mixing orthogonal
private bits [1].
This paper continues on the second approach. The
low dimensional key-distillable states with positive par-
tial transpose [31] (hence, bound entangled) presented in
[1] were lying on the boundary of PPT states and ex-
istence of the key-distillable states inside of PPT states
was argued by the continuity argument, without giving
the explicit form of those inner states. In this paper we
present a wider class of PPT entangled key-distillable
states including states inside the set of PPT states even
approaching the set of separable states. We analyze prop-
erties of this class, as well as provide some more general
criteria of key distillability, by exploiting criterion pro-
vided in [11]. This criterion was earlier applied to analyze
some PPT states in [12] (see also [13] in this context).
The motivation behind the search for new bound en-
tangled states with distillable key, is two-fold. First of
all, there is a fundamental open question, whether from
all entangled states one can draw secure key. To ap-
proach this question, one needs, in particular, to gather
more phenomenology on the issue of drawing key from
bound entangled states. In this paper, we have pushed
this question a bit by showing explicitly that PPT key-
distillable states can be in the interior of PPT states,
even, approaching the set of separable states. Also, our
general criterion of key distillability can serve for search-
ing to what extent entanglement can provide for secure
key.
Another motivation comes from recent experiments,
where bound entanglement was implemented in labs [14–
18]. In the experiments, usually, a four-partite bound en-
tangled Smolin state was used, which allows for a num-
ber of non-classical effects being manifestations of true
entanglement content of such state. We believe that low-
dimensional bound entangled key-distillable states are
also good candidates for experimental implementation,
providing a non-classical effect – possibility of distilling
secure key. This requires states which are robust against
noise, to facilitate the process of preparing them in a lab.
In this paper, we analyze robustness of key-distillable
states as well as provide very noisy states, having, in
particular, relatively large entropy (c.a. 3.5 bits versus 4
bits of maximal possible entropy). Last but not least, the
key-distillable bound entangled states are strictly related
to the effect of superactivation of quantum capacity [19],
and our class may be further analyzed in this respect (in
this paper, we have provided some exemplary calcula-
tions).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review
basic facts about general theory of distillation of secure
2key from quantum states of [10]. In particular, we de-
scribe technique called the privacy squeezing. In Sec. III
we introduce our class of states which are PPT and key-
distillable. We verify that they lie inside the set of PPT
states, touching the set of separable states. Moreover,
we check robustness of the property of key-distillability.
We also give the explicit form of an important subset
of our states as mixtures of pure states in Sec. IV). In
Secs. V and VI we examine entropic properties of our
states and their relation with Smith-Yard superactiva-
tion of quantum capacity phenomenon. Finally, in Sec.
VII, we provide a general sufficient condition for distill-
ing private key from quantum states of local dimension
not less than 4.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let us first recall some important concepts of classical
key distillation from quantum states, covered in detail in
[10].
A general state containing at least one bit of perfectly
secure key is called the private bit or pbit [10]. A private
bit in its so-called X-form is given by
γ(X) =
1
2


√
XX† 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0
√
X†X

 (1)
where X is an arbitrary operator satisfying ‖X‖ = 1
(here and throughout the paper, we use the trace norm,
that is the sum of the singular values of an operator). The
private bit has four subsystems: ABA′B′ where block
matrix (1) represents AB subsystem and the blocks are
operators acting on an A′B′ subsystem. Subsystems A
and B are single qubit subsystems while dimensions of
A′ and B′ must be greater or equal to 2, we assume di-
mensions A′ and B′ are equal and denote them by d.
Subsystem AA′ belongs to Alice while subsystem BB′
belongs to Bob. Every state presented in the block ma-
trix form throughout the paper has this structure. The
bit of key contained in a private bit is obtained by mea-
suring subsystems A and B in the standard basis; there-
fore, subsystem AB is called the key part of the state,
while subsystem A′B′ is called the shield of the state, as
it protects correlations contained in the key part from an
eavesdropper. Note that it may happen that Eve pos-
sesses a copy of the shield subsystem (when, e.g., the
shield consists of two flag states – states with disjoint
support) yet it does not hurt because the very presence
of the shield subsystem in Alice and Bob’s hands protects
the bit of key.
For a general state with ABA′B′ subsystems (i.e., not
necessarily a private bit) one can infer possibility of dis-
tillation of private key using the method called the pri-
vacy squeezing [10]. Namely, we consider the following
type of protocols: one measures the key part in the stan-
dard basis and classically process the outcomes (cf. [11]
for two-qubit states). Given a protocol of this type we
would like to know whether it can distill key from the
state. To this end, we construct a two qubit state in the
following way: one applies to the original state the so-
called twisting operation, i.e., a unitary transformation
of the following form
U =
∑
ij
|ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ UA
′B′
ij (2)
and perform partial trace over A′B′. Now, it turns out
that if we apply the protocol to the original state we
obtain no less key than we would obtain from the above
two qubit state using the same protocol.
Therefore, if we apply a cleverly chosen twisting, we
may infer key-distillability of the original state, by ex-
amining a two-qubit state (i.e., a much simpler object).
This technique is called the privacy squeezing. The role of
twisting is to ‘squeeze’ the privacy present in the original
state into its key part, where it is then more easily de-
tectable, e.g., by protocols designed for two-qubit states
(see e.g., [11, 20, 21]).
To explain why the two qubit state cannot give more
key than the original state (within the considered class
of protocols) we invoke the following result of [10]. One
considers a state of three systems: a quantum one – Eve’s
system and two classical ones – the registers holding the
outcomes of measurement of the key part (the state is
therefore called a ccq state). Now, it turns out that twist-
ing does not change this state. However, in the consid-
ered class of protocols Alice and Bob use only classical
registers, so the output of such protocols depends solely
on the ccq state. Thus the key obtained with and with-
out twisting is exactly the same. This holds, even though
twisting is a non-local operation and the resulting state
can be more powerful under all other respects (such as
drawing key by some other type of protocols). Next, if
we additionally trace out the shield, i.e., the subsystem
A′B′, this means that the resulting ccq state differs from
the original ccq state only by Eve having, in addition,
the shield. Thus, if any key can be obtained from it, it
can only be less secure than the key obtained from the
original ccq state.
It turns out that for any ‘spider’ state, i.e., state of the
form
̺ =


C D
E F
F † E′
D† C′

 (3)
(where we have omitted zero blocks for clarity) there ex-
ists such a twisting operation that the matrix elements
of the two qubit state, obtained by tracing out the A′B′
subsystem after applying the twisting, are equal to trace
3̺ =
1
2


(λ1 + λ2)
√
XX† (λ1 − λ2)X
(λ3 + λ4)
√
Y Y † (λ3 − λ4)Y
(λ3 − λ4)Y † (λ3 + λ4)
√
Y †Y
(λ1 − λ2)X† (λ1 + λ2)
√
X†X

 (4)
FIG. 1: Block matrix form of mixture of four private bits.
norms of the corresponding blocks in the original state:
σ =


‖C‖ ‖D‖
‖E‖ ‖F‖
‖F‖ ‖E′‖
‖D‖ ‖C′‖

 (5)
(we use here that ‖A‖ = ‖A†‖ for trace norm). This
twisting is in a sense optimal for the spider states. We
call the two qubit state (5) the privacy-squeezed state of
the original state. If a spider state satisfies ‖C‖ = ‖C′‖
and ‖E‖ = ‖E′‖ than its privacy-squeezed state is a Bell
diagonal state.
For a deeper discussion of the privacy squeezing see
[10], although the name spider state is not used there.
III. DISTILLING KEY FROM PPT MIXTURES
OF PRIVATE STATES
Here, we construct a class of bound entangled states
which are key-distillable. They are mixtures of four or-
thogonal private bits of some special form. We provide a
sufficient condition to distill cryptographic key from our
class. The condition given in this section is generalized
to an arbitrary state in Sec. VII.
A. Definition of the class
Let us consider a class of states
̺ = λ1γ
+
1 + λ2γ
−
1 + λ3γ
+
2 + λ4γ
−
2 (6)
which is a mixture of four orthogonal private bits which
could be considered analogues to the Bell states. The
construction is possible in dimension 2d⊗2d, with d ≥ 2.
The four private bits are given by
γ±1 = γ(±X), γ±2 = σAx γ(±Y )σAx (7)
where σAx is a Pauli matrix σx applied on subsystem A,
and by γ(X) we mean a private bit written in its X-form
(1).
States given by (6) and (7) have the block matrix form
(4) given on figure 1.
Definition 1. We define the class C as the class of states
given by (6) and (7) with operators X and Y related by
Y =
XΓ
‖XΓ‖ (8)
where superscript Γ denotes the partial transposition in
Alice versus Bob cut; and satisfying the following condi-
tions: the diagonal blocks of (4), i.e., operators
√
XX†,√
X†X,
√
Y Y †,
√
Y †Y are all PPT-invariant, i.e., must
satisfy A = AΓ.
(The relation (8) and PPT-invariance of the diagonal
blocks are necessary to obtain simple conditions for the
state to be PPT, given in Sec. III B).
In particular, the PPT-invariance of the diagonal
blocks holds for
X =
1
u
d−1∑
i,j=0
uij |ij〉〈ji| (9)
where uij are elements of some unitary matrix on Cd and
u =
d−1∑
i,j=0
|uij |. (10)
For the operator X given by (9) we have
‖XΓ‖ = d
u
,
1√
d
≤ ‖XΓ‖ ≤ 1 (11)
where the minimum is achieved for the unimodular uni-
tary [1] and maximum for the identity matrix.
We will sometimes write ̺U to denote the subclass of
the class C with operatorX given by (9) or to stress using
a concrete unitary in the definition of X , in particular,
we will consider the subclass ̺H where uij are elements
of the Hadamard unitary matrix.
In case of d = 2 we will also consider the subclass of
the class C with operators X and Y given by
Y = q YU1 + (1− q)σA
′
x YU2σ
A′
x , X =
Y Γ
‖Y Γ‖ (12)
where
YU =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
uij |ii〉〈jj|. (13)
Unitaries U1 and U2 must have the same global phase,
i.e., α1 = α2 in the parametrization of a single qubit
unitary given by (72) in the appendix. In particular, one
may take U1 = U2.
4We also use an alternative parametrization in terms of
p, α, and β given by
p ≡ λ1 + λ2 ∈ [0, 1] (14)
α ≡ λ1 − λ2
λ1 + λ2
∈ [−1, 1] (15)
β ≡ λ3 − λ4
λ3 + λ4
∈ [−1, 1]. (16)
On the other hand, the original parameters λi can be
expressed using p, α, and β as follows:
λ1,2 =
1± α
2
p (17)
λ3,4 =
1± β
2
(1− p). (18)
Both parametrizations are directly related with the
privacy-squeezed version of the state given by C and (7),
and constructed according to the formula (5):
σ =
∑
i
λi|ψi〉〈ψi| = 1
2


p αp
(1− p) β(1− p)
β(1 − p) (1 − p)
αp p


(19)
where the Bell states ψi are given by
|ψ1,2〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)
|ψ3,4〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (20)
Thus, λi are the eigenvalues of the privacy-squeezed
state, p reports the balance between correlations and
anti-correlations, while α and β report how coherences
are damped.
A subclass of the class C with X defined by (9) has
been considered in [1]:
˜̺ = λ1γ
+
1 + λ3γ
+
2 . (21)
The class C is much wider then (21), in particular, it
contains key-distillable PPT states arbitrary close to the
separable states, but this comes with a price: we have
to, in general, use the recurrence preprocessing to obtain
positive key rate for C while for (21) the sole Devetak-
Winter protocol is enough [1].
B. Sufficient PPT conditions
For the states of the class C to be PPT (so that max-
imal entanglement cannot be distilled from them) it is
sufficient to satisfy the following conditions
|λ1 − λ2| ≤ (1 − λ1 − λ2)‖XΓ‖−1 (22)
|λ3 − λ4| ≤ (λ1 + λ2)‖XΓ‖ (23)
or equivalently
|α| ≤ min(1, α1) (24)
|β| ≤ min(1, α−11 ) (25)
where
α1 =
1− p
p
‖XΓ‖−1. (26)
In particular, if p = λ˜1 where λ˜1 is given by (27), we have
α1 = 1. Moreover, if α = α1β then ̺ is a PPT-invariant
state.
For the subclass (21), the above PPT conditions col-
lapse to a single PPT-invariant state, on the boundary
of PPT states, which satisfies
λ1 = λ˜1 ≡ 1
1 + ‖XΓ‖ . (27)
C. Key distillability
We shall derive here a general sufficient condition for
key-distillability of the spider states with a Bell diagonal
privacy-squeezed state, which easily follows from combin-
ing the privacy squeezing technique with the result of [11]
on key distillation from two-qubit states. It is enough for
our purposes, as states of our class are of that form. (In
Sec. VII we shall extend the key-distillability condition
to arbitrary states by exploiting twirling).
Proposition 1. Let ̺ be a state of the form
̺ =


C D
E F
F † E′
D† C′

 (28)
satisfying ‖C‖ = ‖C′‖ and ‖E‖ = ‖E′‖, i.e., ̺ is a state
having a Bell diagonal privacy-squeezed state. If
max(‖D‖, ‖F‖) >
√
‖C‖‖E‖ (29)
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first
measuring the key part of many copies of the state ̺
and than using the recurrence [22, 23] and the Devetak-
Winter protocol [24].
Remark 1. Note that, interestingly, the condition (29)
is equivalent to requiring that one of the matrices[ ‖C‖ ‖D‖
‖D†‖ ‖E‖
]
,
[ ‖C‖ ‖F‖
‖F †‖ ‖E‖
]
(30)
is not a positive one.
Remark 2. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (29) can
also be written as 12
√
pe(1− pe) where pe is the probabil-
ity of error (i.e. anticorrelation) when key part is mea-
sured in standard basis.
5Proof of the proposition 1. We apply the privacy squeez-
ing technique described in Sec. II, i.e., we show that the
privacy-squeezed state of ̺ is key-distillable by a proto-
col based on measuring the state locally in the standard
basis and classical postprocessing. This implies ̺ is also
key-distillable.
The privacy-squeezed state is precisely of the form (5)
with ‖C‖ = ‖C′‖ and ‖E‖ = ‖E′‖, i.e., it is a Bell diag-
onal state which can be written as
σ =
1
2


a d
e f
f e
d a

 . (31)
For such a state it was shown in [11] that ifmax(|d|, |f |) >√
ae then one can distill key by measuring the state lo-
cally in the standard basis, and processing the resulting
classical data (actually, by using the recurrence followed
by the Devetak-Winter protocol). This is precisely the
type of protocols allowed by the privacy-squeezing tech-
nique described in Sec. II. In our case, the above condi-
tions are simply the ones given in (29).
Due to the form (19) of the privacy-squeezed state of
the states from our class, we immediately obtain suitable
conditions:
Corollary 1. Let ̺ be a state defined by formulas C and
(7) with arbitrary X and Y satisfying ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = 1.
If
|λ1 − λ2| >
√
(λ1 + λ2)(1− λ1 − λ2) (32)
or equivalently if
|α| >
√
1− p
p
(33)
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first
measuring the key part of many copies of the state ̺ and
than using the recurrence and the Devetak-Winter proto-
col.
Corollary 1 also holds if one uses |λ3 − λ4| as the left-
hand side of (32) or equivalently |β| as the left-hand side
of (33), however, in our paper, we do not use these con-
ditions.
Observation 1. For a state of the class C to be both
PPT and key distillable using corollary 1 it must satisfy
both (24) and (33). For a given value of the parameter p
there exist α satisfying both conditions iff p ∈ (12 , pmax)
where
pmax =
1
1 + ‖XΓ‖2 . (34)
0.5 0.6
λ1
0
0.25
δ
Recurrence and Devetak-Winter tolerable noise
Devetak-Winter tolerable noise
White noise needed to make states PPT
region of
PPT key
FIG. 2: Comparison of ˜̺H tolerable noise in case of using
the Devetak-Winter protocol with and without the recurrence
preprocessing.
D. Tolerable white noise
We say that δ is the tolerable noise of a key distillation
protocol for a state ̺ if for any ε < δ the state ̺ε with ε
of the white noise admixtured
̺ε = (1− ε)̺+ ε I
d2
(35)
remains key-distillable with that protocol.
Having p > 12 , the tolerable noise of the Devetak-
Winter protocol with the recurrence preprocessing for the
class C is given by
δ = 1− 1√
8(λ21 + λ
2
2)− 4(λ1 + λ2) + 1
(36)
= 1− 1√
4 (1 + α2) p2 − 4 p+ 1 . (37)
In particular for a key-distillable PPT state ˜̺H with
λ1 = λ˜1 where λ˜1 is given by (27) the tolerable noise for
the Devetak-Winter protocol with the recurrence prepro-
cessing (36) is approximately equal to 0.155 while for the
sole Devetak-Winter protocol it is approximately equal
to 0.005, i.e., it is 31 times smaller. See figure 2.
E. Separability
Given a state ̺U of the class C with X given by (9)
and d = 2, i.e., ̺ is a state of 4 ⊗ 4 system, we may try
to decompose ̺ into a mixture of four two qubit states.
The particular decomposition, which we propose below,
is possible if
|λ3 − λ4| ≤ (1− λ1 − λ2)‖XΓ‖ (38)
or equivalently if
6̺ij =
1
2


λ1 + λ2 (λ1 − λ2)eiφij
λ3 + λ4 (λ3 − λ4)‖XΓ‖−1eiφij
(λ3 − λ4)‖XΓ‖−1e−iφij λ3 + λ4
(λ1 − λ2)e−iφij λ1 + λ2

 (39)
FIG. 3: The form of two qubit Bell diagonal states from decomposition of a state ̺U with d = 2.
|β| ≤ ‖XΓ‖. (40)
All of the four two qubit states in our decomposition
are Bell diagonal states with the same set of eigenvalues.
Thus, the two qubit states are separable (and, hence,
̺ is separable) if all their eigenvalues are less than or
equal to 12 [32]. For our decomposition this happens if,
additionally to (38), the following conditions are satisfied
λ1 ≤ 1
2
(41)
λ2 ≤ 1
2
(42)
|λ3 − λ4| ≤ (λ1 + λ2)‖XΓ‖ (43)
or equivalently, additionally to (40), the following condi-
tions are satisfied
|α| ≤ 1− p
p
(44)
|β| ≤ p
1− p‖X
Γ‖. (45)
Note that conditions (43) and (45) are identical to the
PPT conditions for ̺ given by (23) and (25), respectively.
The decomposition into the four two qubit states has
the form
̺U =
|u00|
u
̺00(|00〉AA′ , |10〉AA′; |00〉BB′ , |10〉BB′)
+
|u01|
u
̺01(|00〉AA′ , |11〉AA′ ; |01〉BB′ , |10〉BB′)
+
|u10|
u
̺10(|01〉AA′ , |10〉AA′ ; |00〉BB′ , |11〉BB′)
+
|u11|
u
̺11(|01〉AA′ , |11〉AA′ ; |01〉BB′ , |11〉BB′) (46)
where uij are the elements of the unitary matrix on C2
used to define operator X in (9), u is given by (10), and
̺ij denote the two qubit states given by (39) on figure 3
where φij comes from the polar decomposition of uij
uij = |uij |eiφij . (47)
The local basis of Alice and Bob for each of the two
qubit states are given in (46) in parenthesis.
F. PPT key arbitrary close to separability
One can obtain key from some 4 ⊗ 4 PPT states ly-
ing arbitrary close to the set of separable states. That
PPT
separable
˜̺H
̺sep
γ
+
1
γ
+
2
̺max
p =
1
2
α = 1
β = ‖XΓ‖ = 1√
2
p = λ˜1 =
1
1 + ‖XΓ‖ ≈ 0.586
α = β = 1
p = pmax =
2
3
α = ‖XΓ‖ = 1√
2
β = 1
FIG. 4: A class of key-distillable PPT entangled states: (a)
the solid line from ˜̺ on the boundary of the PPT entan-
gled states (inclusive) to the boundary of the set of separable
states, arbitrary close to ̺sep; (b) the arc of PPT-invariant
states starting in ˜̺ and approaching arbitrary close to ˜̺max.
is, one can easily select a single parameter subclass of
the class C satisfying PPT conditions and approaching
some separable state with p = 12 such that for any other
state in this class, no matter how close to the separable
state, the key condition (33) is satisfied. Note that if
we chose a separable state with p 6= 12 as the final state
the key condition would be violated before reaching that
final state; thus, we would not approach with the key-
distillable states arbitrary close to the set of separable
states.
Such a class of states, a subclass of ̺H , is illustrated
in figure 4. The dashed line represents the subclass ˜̺H ,
given by (21), a mixture of two pbits (γ+1 and γ
+
2 ) which
in alternate parametrization is equivalent to p ∈ [0, 1] and
α = β = 1. As shown in [1], this class contains exactly
one (boundary) PPT entangled state obtained by setting
p = λ˜1 where λ˜1 is given by (27), otherwise the states
are NPT.
The solid line represents a class of PPT key-distillable
states obtained by setting p ∈ (12 , pmax), α = min(1, α1),
and β = min(1, α−11 ), where pmax = (1 + ‖XΓ‖2)−1 = 23 ,
7see observation 1, while α1 is given by (26), i.e., α1 =
1−p
p
√
2 in the considered case. In the range p ∈ (12 , λ˜1]
the class is represented as a straight line from the PPT
state of the previous class ˜̺H on one end (p = λ˜1) and
approaches arbitrary close to the separable state ̺sep
(p = 12 ) on the other end. In the range p ∈ [λ˜1, pmax)
the states are PPT-invariant and lie on the boundary
of PPT entangled states, they are represented as an arc
from the PPT state of the previous class ˜̺H on one end
(p = λ˜1) and approach arbitrary close to the state ̺max
(p = pmax) on the other end. In the range p ∈ (λ˜1, pmax)
one could take α < α1, such that the key condition (33)
is still satisfied, to enter inside the class of PPT states.
IV. STATES ̺H AS MIXTURES OF BELL
STATES WITH ‘FLAGS’
States of the class ̺H are separable in the AB : A
′B′
cut, i.e., subsystems AB and A′B′ of ̺H are are only
classically correlated. A state from ̺H can be decom-
posed into a mixture of four states. Each of the four
states has a Bell state ψi on the subsystem AB and some
corresponding state on A′B′.
One can select parameters p ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ [−1, 1], and
β ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying both the PPT conditions (24) and
(25) and the key condition (33), and prepare a corre-
sponding PPT key-distillable state from the class ̺H
which has the form
̺H =
4∑
i=1
qi |ψi〉〈ψi|AB ⊗ ̺(i)A′B′ (48)
where the Bell states ψi are given by (20) and the corre-
lated states are the following:
̺(1) = α
1
2
(P00 + Pψ3) + (1 − α)
I
4
(49)
̺(2) = α
1
2
(P11 + Pψ4) + (1 − α)
I
4
(50)
̺(3,4) = βPχ± + (1− β)
1
2
(P00 + P11) (51)
where Pψ denotes the projector onto a pure state ψ and
χ± =
1√
2±√2
(|00〉 ± |ψ1〉) (52)
q1 = q2 =
p
2
(53)
q3 = q4 =
1− p
2
. (54)
V. MAXIMIZING VON NEUMANN ENTROPY
In this section, we find 4⊗4 key-distillable PPT states
with a quite high von Neumann entropy for two sub-
classes of the class C and summarize the results in a ta-
ble.
A. For states of the class ̺U
Here, we find the supremum of the von Neumann en-
tropy of the subclass ̺U of the class C withX given by (9)
consisting of states that are both PPT and key-distillable
by corollary 1. Let as denote this set of states as PKd,
subscripted with the dimension of the unitary used to
define operator X .
As ̺ is a mixture of four orthogonal private bits its
von Neumann entropy is given by
S(̺U ) = H(p) + p
(
H
(
1− α
2
)
+ S(
√
X†X)
)
+ (1 − p)
(
H
(
1− β
2
)
+ S(
√
Y †Y )
)
(55)
where
S(
√
X†X) ≤ 2 log2 d (56)
S(
√
Y †Y ) = log2 d (57)
and the maximal value in (56) is achieved if the unitary
used to define X in (9) is unimodular. A unimodular
unitary also maximizes the allowed range of p given by
observation 1, as it achieves minimum of ‖XΓ‖. Hence,
to maximize the entropy, it is enough to consider a uni-
modular unitary. The supremum is achieved for a state
with p = pmax, β = 0, and α =
√
1−p
p
(which no longer
satisfies our key-distillability condition) thus
sup
̺U∈PKd
S(̺U ) = sup
p∈( 1
2
,pmax)
(
(1 + p) log2 d+ (1− p)
+H(p) + pH
(
1−
√
1−p
p
2
))
(58)
where pmax = (1 + ‖XΓ‖2)−1 comes from observation 1.
In particular, for d = 2, i.e., ̺ being 4 ⊗ 4 states, the
supremum is achieved for state having p = pmax = 2/3
which gives
sup
̺U∈PK2
S(̺U ) ≈ 3.319. (59)
The supremum corresponds to a state ̺max on figure 4
but with β = 0.
B. For states of a class larger than ̺U
For the subclass ̺ of the class C with d = 2 and X and
Y given by (12), we are able to obtain
S(̺) ≈ 3.524 (60)
for U1 = U2 = H , q ≈ 0.683, β = 0 and α, p taken as in
the previous subsection. It seems to be the supremum of
the von Neumann entropy for this selection of operators
X and Y .
8C. Summary
Here, we summarize the results of maximizing von
Neumann entropy of 4 ⊗ 4 key-distillable PPT states in
the following table:
S(̺) ̺ satisfying PPT and key conditions
2.564 class ˜̺ from [1] with p = λ˜1, the maximum is
achieved for U = H
3.319 class ̺U , the supremum is described in Sec. VA
3.524 class C with Y given by (12), a supposed supre-
mum is described in Sec. VB
VI. DISTILLABILITY VIA ERASURE
CHANNEL
In [19], it was shown that two zero capacity chan-
nels, if combined together, can have nonzero capacity.
One of the channels was related (through so called Choi-
Jamiołkowski (CJ) isomorphism) to a bound entangled
but key-distillable state, while the other was a so called
symmetrically extendable channel. In particular, they
considered an example, where the first channel had 4⊗ 4
CJ state from the class (21) while the second one was
the 50%-erasure channel. In [25] a simpler scheme was
proposed, which also allows to observe this curious phe-
nomenon.
The second approach amounts to sending a subsystem
A′ of a state defined on systems ABA′B′ through the
50%-erasure channel and checking the coherent informa-
tion of the resulting state. If it is positive one concludes
that the capacity of combined channel is also positive.
Here, we shall use this approach to see how the presence
of coherence β influence the phenomenon.
Coherent information after sending the A′ subsystem
through the 50%-erasure channel is given by
Icoh =
1
2
(SA′BB′ − S) + 1
2
(SBB′ − SABB′) (61)
where S, SA′BB′ , and SBB′ are given by (55), (62), and
(63), respectively.
For a PPT state ˜̺ given by (21) with X given by (9)
and based on unimodular unitary and λ1 = λ˜1, where
λ˜1 is given by (27), the coherent information is positive
starting from d = 11. For a similar state of our class
with p = λ˜1, α = 1 and β = 0 the coherent information
is positive starting from d = 22.
Formulas for SA′BB′ and SBB′ are as follows:
S(̺A′BB′) = 1 +
1
2
S
(
p
√
XX† + (1− p)
√
Y †Y
)
+
1
2
S
(
p
√
X†X + (1− p)
√
Y Y †
)
(62)
S(̺BB′) = 1 +
1
2
SB
(
p
√
XX† + (1− p)
√
Y †Y
)
+
1
2
SB
(
p
√
X†X + (1− p)
√
Y Y †
)
. (63)
VII. CONDITION FOR DRAWING SECURE
KEY FROM GENERAL STATES
From Sec. III C, we have a sufficient condition for draw-
ing key in terms of norms of the nonzero blocks from
states having a Bell diagonal privacy-squeezed state. In
this section, we generalize that condition to the case of
an arbitrary state.
Let us define two twirling operations (cf. [23])
ΛXX =
1
2
(Iˆ ⊗ Iˆ + Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ) (64)
ΛZZ =
1
2
(Iˆ ⊗ Iˆ + Zˆ ⊗ Zˆ) (65)
and one twirling with flags
Λ′XX(̺) =
1
2
(̺⊗ |0〉〈0|+ Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ(̺)⊗ |1〉〈1|) (66)
where Uˆ̺ = U̺U †, X and Z are Pauli matrices.
Now, we give a sufficient condition to obtain key from
a general state.
Proposition 2. For an arbitrary state
̺ =


A B C D
B† E F G
C† F † H I
D† G† I† J

 (67)
if
max(‖D‖, ‖F‖) > 1
2
√
(‖A‖+ ‖J‖)(‖E‖+ ‖H‖) (68)
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first
applying twirling Λ′XX ◦ΛZZ to the key part and measur-
ing the key part of many copies of the state ̺ and than
using the recurrence and the Devetak-Winter protocol.
Remark 3. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (68) can
also be written as 12
√
pe(1− pe) where pe is the probabil-
ity of error (i.e. anticorrelation) when key part is mea-
sured in standard basis.
Proof of the proposition 2. Alice and Bob first apply
twirling Λ′XX ◦ ΛZZ (an LOCC operation) to the key
part and obtain the following state
Λ′XX ◦ ΛZZ(̺)
=


A⊕ J D ⊕D†
E ⊕H F ⊕ F †
F ⊕ F † E ⊕H
D ⊕D† A⊕ J

 . (69)
9This state is now of the spider form and, thanks to flags,
we have direct sums within the blocks. Now, the privacy-
squeezed state has the following Bell diagonal form
σ =
=


‖A‖+ ‖J‖ ‖D‖+ ‖D†‖
‖E‖+ ‖H‖ ‖F‖+ ‖F †‖
‖F‖+ ‖F †‖ ‖E‖+ ‖H‖
‖D‖+ ‖D†‖ ‖A‖+ ‖J‖

 .
(70)
Then the proof follows from proposition 1.
Note that in the proof above we use Λ′XX , a twirling
with flags. If ΛXX , a twirling without flags, were used
instead we would have to replace ‖D‖ with ‖D+D†‖ in
(68) (analogously for ‖F‖) which can be much smaller
than ‖D‖, and even equal to zero in the extreme case of
antihermitian D, i.e., D† = −D, so in this case no key
can be distilled from ΛXX(̺) even if ̺ is a private state,
i.e., ̺ = γ(D).
Note also, that in the proof, we have first applied
twirling with flags to the original state, and then the
privacy-squeezing operation. Actually, the same state
would be obtained if we first apply the privacy squeezing
and then apply (standard) twirling. This is illustrated
by the following diagram
̺
Λ′XX◦ΛZZ−−−−−−−→ ̺′
Psq
y yPsq
σ
ΛXX◦ΛZZ−−−−−−−→ σ′
(71)
where Psq stands for the privacy squeezing. As explained
above, this diagram would not commute if we used solely
twirling without flags. Thus, to seek for key-distillable
states, one can go the alternative route, i.e., first compute
the privacy-squeezed state, and then, by twirling, obtain
a Bell diagonal state. Now, if ΛXX ◦ ΛZZ(σ) satisfies
necessary security condition for realistic QKD on a Pauli
channel from [11], i.e., its eigenvalues λi satisfy (32), then
̺ is key-distillable using proposition 2.
VIII. APPENDIX
The parametrization of a single qubit unitary [26]:
U = eiα
[
ei(−
β
2
− δ
2 ) cos
(
γ
2
) −ei(− β2+ δ2 ) sin (γ2 )
ei(
β
2
− δ
2 ) sin
(
γ
2
)
ei(
β
2
+ δ
2 ) cos
(
γ
2
)
]
. (72)
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